Myth Buster

A new feature where we invite members to submit a question to info@nwpc.org.uk

Myth

I currently work in Approved Premises so I will be automatically transferred to the reserved service.

Busted

The mechanism for deciding who will be in the reserved service and who will be transferred to the New Co has not been agreed.

 

Myth No1

Payment by result will bring around a reduction in the delivery of an Offender Management service

 

Buster

There is no evidence to show that PBR will bring about any change as it is as yet untested in this field

 

Myth No2

Competition will bring about a better service with reduced costs

 

Buster

It is likely that the private sector will concentrate on those offender that pay the best bonuses.  The probation trusts cannot compete on a level footing as they cannot raise capital as the private sector can and are victims to treasury rules (Note 1)

 

Myth No3

These new measures will lead to a reduction in reoffending rates

 

Buster

The justice secretary, Chris Grayling, has admitted his plans for the wholesale outsourcing of the probation service will not lead to an overnight reduction in stubbornly high reoffending rates but said he hoped it would lead to a “steady year-by-year decline”.  Statistics already show a continued reduction

 

Myth No4

These measures will capture the best of public, private and voluntary sectors to tackle reoffending rates.

 

Buster

If there are skills out there that could reduce the reoffending rate then why can they not be brought into the Public sector, last year the government spent £1.8 Billion on consultants.  Bringing in these skill will ensure that primary control of offender management would remain with the government.

 

Myth No5

High reoffending rates among short-term prisoners is evidence of probation failure

 

Buster

The Probation Service has no statutory responsibility for supervising anybody sentenced to 12 months or less. Reoffending rates for the individuals that probation does supervise are much improved; with those who complete programmes with a reoffending rate of 35%.  But The Minister does not mention that.

 

Myth No6

This move will cut reoffending

 

Buster

This is not about re offending and simply about diverting money into the hands of Tory donors.  It is purely ideological, and is being rushed through without proper thought to the consequences

 

Myth No 7

Market forces will drive down costs and improve efficiency

 

Buster

Railways

The national rail system was dismantled for privatisation. Railtrack took over responsibility for track and signalling, train services were franchised to train operating companies who lease the rolling stock from three rail leasing companies. Maintenance, depots and freight services were also privatised to other companies.

 

Railtrack PLC, was placed in administration on 7 October 2001 and replaced by Network Rail, a non-profit company, which owns and maintains the tracks, signals, bridges and 2,500 stations. Network Rail stopped outsourcing maintenance and transferred 16,000 maintenance staff, over 5,000 road vehicles, 600 depots and 11 training centres to in-house provision. The South East train franchise was terminated in 2003 following years of poor performance and the company operating the London-Edinburgh franchise defaulted in 2006. Poor performance and overcrowding continues on many services despite large public subsidies.

 

Hospital cleaning

The NHS market testing programme led to a series of contract failures and reduction in cleaning standards in the 1983-2000 period (Public Service Action, 1983-1997). By 2002 some 52% of domestic services contracts were outsourced with an estimated value of £94m according to an unpublished NHS outsourcing study. However, standards had declined to such an extent that by 2004 an additional £68m had been invested in higher standards, revised frequencies and best practice guidance to control infection, thus eliminating so-called savings.

 

British Energy

The privatised nuclear power generator, supplying 20% of Britain’s electricity, had to be bailed out by the government to the tune of £410m in 2002 to meet the company’s debts. A restructuring deal was agreed in which the company’s creditors agreed a debt-for-equity swap leaving the existing shareholders with just 2.5% of the shares. British Energy was delisted from the London Stock Exchange.

 

Bus services, prisons and social care

The deregulation and privatisation of municipal bus services, new private prisons built by public private partnerships and the transfer of social care to private companies and voluntary organisations were all declared ‘successful’ because they achieved ‘savings’. But staff wages were cut between 15% – 25% with longer working hours and frequently no pensions..

 

Public Private Partnerships fail information technology

Following a series of major failures Public Private Partnerships have not been used for information technology projects since 2003. A hundred outsourced public sector information technology contracts have suffered long delays, cost overruns and system failures.

 

Strategic partnership failures

Three large long-term local government contracts (14%) for corporate services with a £685m value have failed since 2005. Two contracts, Bedfordshire County Council and West Berkshire Council, were terminated and a 1,000 staff transferred back in-house and a third, Redcar and Cleveland, has been substantially reduced. In addition, a £100m education contract to manage the education service in the London Borough of Southwark was also terminated because of poor performance.

 

UK: 105 public sector ICT contract failures

http://www.european-services-strategy.org.uk/outsourcing-ppp-library/contract-and-privatisation-failures/105-public-sector-ict-contract-failures/

The Research Report identifies the scope of major cost overruns, delays and terminations in 105 outsourced public sector ICT projects in central government, NHS, local authorities, public bodies and agencies in the last decade. There has been wide reporting of individual and department or authority-wide project failures in the national and ICT press but little analysis of the overall scope and evidence. The value of contacts is nearly